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ABSTRACT 
After nearly thirty years in rule, the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt was considered by 
many to be as “immovable as the pyramids” (Hamid 2011: 102). However, the collapse of 
this regime in 2011, following a mere eighteen days of protests stymied many scholars who 
began to question how such a revered ‘pharaoh’ could have fallen so abruptly. In this 
thesis, I try to provide an answer to this question. I hypothesise that the collapse of the 
Mubarak regime was facilitated by four developments, which, when combined, exposed 
the  true  hollowness  of  the  regime’s  coercive  and  persuasive  powers.  These  four 
developments were: the declining legitimacy of the Mubarak regime; the defection of key 
internal  and  external  allies  from  the  regime;  the  coalescence  of  a  broad  and  unified 
opposition;  and  the  strategic  use  of  social  media  by  that  opposition.  Through  the 
development of a theoretical framework and the subsequent application of that framework 
to  the  case  study  of  Egypt,  this  thesis  finds  that  all  four  of  these  developments  were 
present  and  did  in  fact  facilitate  the  collapse of  the  Mubarak  regime  by  revealing  the 
regime’s lack of coercive and persuasive powers. 3 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the Arab Spring Revolutions appeared to confirm Huntington’s (1991: 23) claim 
that Middle Eastern states would become “too wealthy and too complex for their various 
traditional, military and one-party systems of authoritarian rule to sustain themselves.” 
Indeed,  after  nearly  thirty  years  of  assertive  rule  in  Egypt,  the  strongest  authoritarian 
regime in the Middle East, that of Hosni Mubarak, was overthrown on 11 February 2011 
following  just  eighteen  days  of  popular  revolts  (El-Ghobashy  2011).  The  collapse  of 
Mubarak’s regime came unexpectedly with many questioning how it could have happened 
so rapidly to a regime which was considered to be a resilient and cohesive machine (El-
Ghobashy 2011).  Many others also questioned why the collapse occurred and what factors 
could have brought about the monumental fall of such a revered ‘pharaoh’ (Bellin 2011). 
 
Through  qualitative  research  and  typification  of  causal  explanations  present  in  regime 
transition theories, many of which were developed following the third wave of democracy 
in the 1970s, this thesis will seek to answer the question of why the Mubarak regime 
collapsed.  The  regime  transition  theories  that  are  examined  will  help  to  provide  an 
explanatory  framework  regarding  how  regime  collapse  occurs  and  why  authoritarian 
regimes collapse. This framework will then be used to explain the collapse of the Mubarak 
regime. The background and characteristics of the Mubarak regime, including its methods 
of rule, will be outlined so as to provide a context to evaluate changes that occurred prior 
to its collapse. Then the theoretical causal framework developed in the first section of this 
thesis will be applied to the collapse of the Mubarak regime so as to gain an understanding 
of the contributing factors. 
 
The hypothesis put forward in this thesis is that the collapse of the Mubarak regime was 
brought  about  by  four  key  developments,  which,  when  combined,  exposed  the  true 
hollowness of the regime’s coercive and persuasive power. Without either persuasive or 
coercive power to sustain its rule, Mubarak had little choice but to tender his resignation 
and allow the empire he had built over thirty years to crumble. The four developments that 
will be examined are the declining legitimacy of the Mubarak regime; the defection of key 
internal and external allies, the coalescence of a broad and unified opposition and the 
strategic use of social media by the opposition.  
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Declining regime legitimacy brought about the increased use of legitimation tactics by the 
Mubarak  regime  over  an  extended  period.  These  legitimation  tactics  included  election 
manipulation,  the  creation  of  enemies  external  to  the  population  and  regime,  and 
hereditary leadership selection. These tactics were used by the regime as, gradually, the 
purpose for which the regime was originally installed disappeared. The use of legitimation 
tactics increased as the years passed and became increasingly blatant. This in turn led to 
increased discontent in the population as the regime was perceived as no longer having a 
legitimate right to rule. Effectively, this discontent undermined the effectiveness of the 
regime’s persuasive power as the population was no longer willing to be swayed by regime 
propaganda. The declining legitimacy of the Mubarak regime was further exacerbated by 
poor regime performance in the areas of human rights, the economy, unemployment and 
law and order.  
 
Shifts in foreign policy by major external allies also limited the Mubarak regime’s ability to 
use persuasive power both internationally and domestically. The lack of international actors 
willing  to  intervene  militarily  or  offer  even  verbal  support  to  Mubarak  once  uprisings 
occurred limited the regime’s coercive sources of power. Internally, the defection of the 
military,  a  key  ally of many  authoritarian  regimes, severely  undermined  the scope  and 
cohesion  of  Mubarak’s  coercive  apparatus.  The  support  the  military  tendered  to  the 
opposition shifted the power balance between the ruler and the ruled. 
 
The collapse of the Mubarak regime was also facilitated by the coalescence of a united and 
broad opposition. When faced with an opposition group that represented all segments of 
the population in Egypt, the Mubarak regime lost the ability to manipulate the population 
through propaganda, was unable to adopt a policy of divide and rule and could not offer 
inducements or co-opt selected opposition leaders. The presence of a unified opposition 
group  also  limited  Mubarak’s  ability  to  exercise  violence  against  any  segment  of  the 
population without causing further dissent amongst all of the protestors. The non-violent 
uprisings significantly impacted on the military’s decision to defect from the regime as, 
without the presence of violent protests, the use of coercive power by the regime could not 
be justified. 
 
The strategic use of social media by protestors was also instrumental in contributing to the 
collapse  of  the  Mubarak  regime.  Effectively,  the  strategic  use  of  social  media  allowed 7 
 
protestors to organise uprisings, develop unified motivations and goals and learn from the 
uprisings which brought about the collapse of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia. 
The  Mubarak  regime  was  unable  to  stem  the  flow  of  information  and  anti-regime 
propaganda, thereby losing control of its persuasive power. The use of social media by 
protestors to evade authorities hindered the ability of the Mubarak regime to successfully 
employ its coercive apparatus. 
 
Through the application of the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to the case of 
Egypt, this thesis will find that Mubarak’s regime had long been experiencing a decline in its 
legitimacy. Furthermore, the Mubarak regime had lost extensive external legitimacy prior 
to the uprisings as a result of its involvement in extraordinary rendition and illegal torture 
of terrorist suspects. However, this thesis will also find that the developments of military 
defection, the formation of a unified and broad opposition and the strategic use of social 
media by the opposition emerged immediately prior to the collapse of the regime. As such, 
all four developments outlined in the theoretical framework will be argued to have been 
present in the case of Egypt and this thesis will find that, when these four development 
combined,  Mubarak’s  lack  of  persuasive  and  coercive  power  was  exposed  therefore 
significantly contributing to the collapse of his regime. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Ontological and Epistemological Approach 
The paradigm of post-positivism is employed in this thesis with an ontological approach of 
critical  realism,  which  considers  the  nature  of  reality  to  be  real  but  only  imperfectly 
apprehendable,  and  an  epistemological  approach  of  modified  objectivism,  in  which 
objectivity remains the “regulatory ideal” and findings of research are always subject to 
falsification (Guba & Lincoln 1994: 110).  The core goal of critical realism is to discover both 
the observable and non-observable mechanisms of events (Krauss 2005: 762). As such, by 
adopting an ontological approach of critical realism, the author has been able to explain a 
particular social phenomenon, that of regime collapse, by revealing the possible causal 
mechanisms behind the phenomenon (Dey 1993). Such causal mechanisms are identified in 
critical  realism  through  a process  of  theoretical  reasoning  and  experimentation  (Krauss 
2005: 762). 
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 Through such processes, critical realism allows social scientists to take an epistemological 
approach of modified objectivism by acknowledging the “inherent complexity that exists in 
the world” and that any argument put forward as to how causal mechanisms operate are 
therefore “real but fallible” (Krauss 2005: 762). This is especially relevant in the case of 
regime collapse. Whilst the author has attempted to consider all causal explanations for the 
regime collapse in Egypt, no one theory can ever be said to provide the absolute picture of 
what occurred.   
 
In considering the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the process outlined above has been 
followed  and  the  use  of  well-developed  regime  transition  theories  have  informed  the 
author  of  the  causal  mechanisms  of  regime  collapse  and  provided  the  basis  for  solid 
theoretical reasoning. The use of a case study has allowed the author to experiment with 
the theoretical reasoning and assess its validity. 
 
Methodology  
The methodology used for this thesis has been founded primarily on qualitative analysis. 
This  methodology  was  chosen  as  it  allows  for  the  investigation  of  identified  social 
phenomenon and seeks to provide deeper understandings than can be obtained solely 
through quantitative data (Silverman 2001).  As Silverman (2001) notes, “…there are areas 
of social reality which statistics cannot measure”; regime collapse is one of these areas. By 
using  qualitative  analysis,  the  author  has  been  able  to  categorise  and  organise  the 
“subtleties of… [a] social phenomenon in a meaningful way” (Krauss 2005: 766). Whilst 
some  statistical  analysis  has  been  utilised,  especially  when  considering  the  economic 
performance of regimes, many of the factors linked with regime collapse could not be 
measured nor understood in terms of quantitative data alone. 
 
The  rationale  of  using  a  single  case  study  for  this  thesis  was  to  enable  the  author  to 
comprehensively consider and apply a substantial number of contextual factors and causal 
explanations in a relatively brief space. The use of a single case study not only provides 
conceptual validity to the causal explanations identified in the theoretical causal framework 
but also allows the analysis of complex and interconnected causalities (George & Bennet 
2005). The use of case studies is imperative in social science as it does not, and cannot 
provide scholars with “hard theories” (Flyvbjerg 2006). Rather, knowledge gained in social 
sciences  is  context-dependent  and  the  exploration  of  theories  through  case  studies  is 
therefore crucial (Flyvbjerg 2006).  9 
 
Data collection and analysis  
The  author  initially  researched  academic  literature,  which  had  a  core  focus  on  regime 
transition theory, and subsequently typified the general themes, or causal explanations, 
present in the literature. Following this, the author categorised these causal explanations 
into primary or secondary factors. As an example, regime performance was categorised as a 
secondary  factor  as  it  was  considered  to  contribute  toward  the  presence  of  declining 
regime legitimacy, a primary factor. The names assigned to each of the causal explanations 
directly reflected the themes present in the literature. Qualitative data was also sourced 
from secondary resources such as newspaper articles, social media sites and online blogs 
for the Egyptian case study. The author then performed thematic content analysis of these 
sources so as to identify common themes relevant to both the primary and secondary 
causal explanations identified in the regime transition literature. Discourse analysis was 
also  employed  by  the  author  when  assessing  online  blogs  and  the  speeches  made  by 
Mubarak  during  the  uprisings  and  data-analysis  of  information  available  through 
independent organisations such as the World Bank and Freedom House was also utilised.  
 
It is noted that information provided by primary resources, such as that which could be 
obtained through interviews with those involved in the regime collapse in Egypt, would 
have enriched the case study section of this paper and provided noteworthy evidence to 
assess the plausibility of the theoretical causal framework developed. However, due to 
budgetary and time constraints, such an approach was not possible. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many types of authoritarian regime change which lend themselves to academic 
observation  (Linz  1990:  143).  For  analytical  purposes  Linz  (1990)  categorised  regime 
changes  into  three  processes,  namely  reforma,  ruptforma  and  ruptura.  As  Huntington 
(1991: 14) notes, in all three of the regime paths outlined by Linz, groups that are both in 
power and out of power play a role in the regime change. However, the usefulness of the 
three paths is that they distinguish between how much of a role is played by each group 
and, to what extent each group is responsible for the regime change (Huntington 1991: 
114). 
 
Reforma is used to label regime changes in which the ruling elites instigate democratic 
reforms  without  doing  so  to  alleviate  any  internal  dissent  or  opposition  (Linz  1990; 10 
 
Huntington 1991: 114). In this path, the regime itself is the most important actor as it plays 
a “decisive role” in ending authoritarian practices and bringing about democratic reforms 
(Huntington 1991: 124). In contrast, ruptforma occurs as a result of joint action by both 
opposition groups and the regime (Linz 1990; Huntington 1991: 114). As such, those in 
power and out of power are seen to play a fifty-fifty role in bringing about regime changes. 
Ruptforma could occur as a result of protests or uprisings which the ruling elites respond to 
effectively  or  as  a  result  of  the  regime  co-opting  opposition  parties  (Linz  1990).  For 
example, reforms could be offered in the form of greater individual freedoms and, when 
lived up to by the regime, cause a change to authoritarian practices and allow for some 
democratic practices to surface (Linz 1990). 
 
The final path is that of ruptura which occurs when an authoritarian regime collapses from 
the actions of opposition groups (Linz 1990; Huntington 1991: 114). In this path, groups 
that do not hold power play the most significant role as a regime can only take this path in 
conditions of revolution and mass protests (Linz 1990: 152). There are three phases in the 
ruptura process: the struggle to produce the fall of the regime, the fall of the regime and 
the struggle after the fall (Huntington 1991: 142). Huntington (1991: 144) argues that a 
triggering event must occur to “crystallize the disaffection” of those out of power as only 
opposition groups that are united have the ability to wear down the regime and shift the 
balance of power. The collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt clearly falls within this 
concept of ruptura as opposition groups instigated uprisings and were apathetic toward the 
proposed concessions and reforms offered by Mubarak (El-Ghobashy 2011).  
 
 As such, for the purpose of this thesis, only the path of ruptura will be considered. As 
noted by Linz (1990: 149) regime ruptura occurs as a result of a “constellation of social and 
political  forces…the  nature  of  the  authoritarian  regime…and,  to  some  extent,  the 
international context”. The literature on authoritarian regime collapse is complex and even 
from a brief overview it quickly becomes apparent that it is a multi-faceted process which 
involves shifts in areas of politics, the economy and society. In offering variables that may 
cause regime collapse, the literature focuses on both structural and non-structural factors 
in addition to factors that are exogenous and endogenous to the regime and the state in 
which the regime operates. Exogenous factors are argued to be equally as important as 
endogenous  factors  when  considering  regime  collapse.  Indeed,  as  noted  by  Kesselman 
(1973: 149), the picture of regime collapse is “less than complete if one treats [regimes]… 11 
 
as isolated and autonomous”. As such, any theory that accounts for regime collapse must 
also account for variables such as external political influence, foreign military assistance, 
the power of dependency relationships and the manipulative power of trade relationships 
(Kesselman 1973: 149). 
 
Structural factors are observable factors which include the institutions and frameworks in 
which the regime operates and includes both domestic structures, such as economic policy, 
and international structures, such as the United Nations, the World Bank and multinational 
corporations (Kesselman 1973). Structural factors are significant as they can limit the ability 
of regimes to deal with uprisings and manage crises in addition to actually being causative 
variables of regime collapse themselves (Mahoney & Snyder 1999). Non-structural factors 
are  non-observable  factors  which  result  from  the  choices  and  strategies  of  key  actors 
involved  in  the  regime  collapse  (Mahoney  &  Snyder  1999).  Such  factors  include  the 
decisions made by the opposition, by protestors and even those decisions made by regime 
leaders and international actors (Mahoney & Snyder 1999). 
 
Mahoney and Snyder’s (1999) work is of imperative importance when considering both the 
structural and non-structural causative variables of regime collapse. These authors argue 
that,  in  order  to  achieve  a  truly  integrative  theory,  both  structural  and  non-structural 
variables must be accounted for. Indeed, Mahoney and Snyder (1999) critique the work of 
many prominent theorists in the field of regime change and argue that they place excessive 
emphasis on either structural or non-structural variables when both should be accounted 
for. Mahoney and Snyder (1999: 9) also highlight in their work that most of the causative 
variables enunciated in the literature on regime collapse can be categorised into one of 
three core themes or causal explanations. These causal explanations are declining regime 
legitimacy, the defection of international key allies and the military, and the coalescence of 
a broad and unified opposition (Mahoney & Snyder 1999). Recently, however, a fourth 
causal explanation has emerged in the academic literature; the strategic use of social media 
by the opposition to bring about the collapse of authoritarian regimes (Scott 2012; Shirky 
2011).  Many  scholars  have  identified  that  the  influential  power  of  social  media  is  not 
limited to the social realm and that its use has broader implications for politics and political 
structures  including  the  loss  of  power  by  regimes  (Scott  2012).  It  is  these  four  causal 
explanations that will be used to develop a theoretical causal framework with which to 
assess the collapse of the Mubarak regime. 12 
 
 
Before considering each of these four causal explanations, however, it is imperative to 
consider the fundamental role that power plays in the collapse of authoritarian regimes as, 
without power, regimes cannot exist (Goodwin 2007: 323).  Essentially, it is only when 
regimes lose power that their downfall can occur (Levitsky & Way 2010: 57; Bellin 2004: 
129).  Two  forms  of  power  have  been  identified  in  academic  literature,  persuasive  and 
coercive, and all regimes, democratic or authoritarian, rely on a combination of these two 
types of power to retain control (Sedgwick 2010: 252). Persuasive power, also referred to 
as soft power, is the use of incentives, diplomacy, propaganda or co-optation by a regime 
to influence and manipulate individuals into acquiescing to its rule (Goodwin 2007: 328). 
Regimes  utilise  persuasive  power  to  achieve  “the  deference  and  cooperation”  of  the 
population and to help establish regime legitimacy in the minds of the population (Goodwin 
2007:  328).  Coercive  power,  or  hard  power,  is  the  ability  of  a  regime  to  repress  and 
intimidate potential opponents, both internal and external to the regime, through the use 
of threats and real violence (Levitsky & Way 2010: 57). Coercive power is measured utilising 
two dimensions: scope and cohesion (Levitsky & Way 2010: 58). Scope refers to the size of 
a regime’s coercive apparatus, which incorporates all of its security sectors, and cohesion 
refers to the level of compliance from those within the coercive apparatus to orders issued 
by  the  regime  (Levitsky  &  Way  2010:  59).  Declines  in  either  of  these  dimensions  can 
significantly hinder a regime’s ability to employ coercive power (Levitsky & Way 2010: 59). 
 
If a regime’s ability to use coercive power is removed, it is then forced to rely solely on its 
persuasive  power  (Levitsky  &  Way  2010:  59).  Reliance  on  persuasive  powers  alone, 
especially  during  times  of  regime  instability,  requires  exceptional  political  talents  and 
oratory skills (Huntington 1968: 345). However, such political talents are rare (Huntington 
1986: 345). Therefore, a regime’s sole reliance on persuasive power is unlikely to guarantee 
long term regime stability or rule as dissidents seeking power are likely to emerge (Levitsky 
&  Way  2010:  60).  Similarly,  declines  in  a  regime’s  persuasive  power,  which  can  occur 
through the population’s awareness of the empty claims on which the regime bases its 
power, compels regimes to rely solely on their coercive power (Schlumberger 2007: 9). 
However,  as  Schlumberger  (2007:  9)  notes,  coercive  power  does  not,  by  itself,  enable 
regimes to maintain power nor does it ensure regime stability. It will be shown in the 
discussion that follows that each of the four causal explanations outlined in the regime 13 
 
transition literature attribute to a regime’s loss  of either coercive or persuasive power 
thereby ushering in the collapse of the regime. 
 
Declining Regime Legitimacy 
Regimes  utilise  specific  strategies  to  maintain  their  power;  however,  it  is  these  same 
strategies that may cause a decline in regime legitimacy and, ultimately, cause a loss of 
persuasive power (Schlumberger 2007: 12). By using illicit tactics, such as election rigging, 
over substantial periods of time to maintain power, the populations ruled by authoritarian 
regimes  become  increasingly  aware  of  the  illegitimacy  of  the  regime’s  claim  to  power 
(Schlumberger 2007). The initial reasons for supporting the regime often fade over time 
and a regime’s increasing reliance on illicit legitimation tactics to convince its population of 
its right to rule causes discontent in the population (Huntington 1991: 55). Essentially, the 
population is no longer persuaded by the regime’s claims to legitimately exercise power.  
 
This is not to say that authoritarian regimes do not use illicit legitimation tactics from the 
outset.  Indeed,  many  authoritarian  regimes  employ  illicit  legitimation  tactics  from  the 
beginning of their rule as even the harshest authoritarian regimes cannot rely solely on 
coercive  forms  of  power  to  govern  (Schlumberger  2007:  3).  As  Sedgewick  (2010:  265) 
argues, a “completely coercive political system is unthinkable”. Thus, legitimation tactics 
are used by the regime to persuade the population to follow its rule.  However, it is the 
increased use of illicit legitimation tactics when valid sources of legitimacy begin to wane 
that begins to foster and slowly build discontent in the population (Schlumberger 2007). In 
short, the regime is no longer perceived by the population to be necessary or appropriate 
and the regime’s claim to rule is undermined (Dix 1982: 561). 
 
When confronted with declining regime legitimacy and increasing population discontent at 
the use of illicit legitimation tactics, authoritarian rulers usually respond with an increased 
use of coercive power, most notably with more repression and violence in an attempt to 
preserve power (Huntington 1991: 55). This, in turn, can lead to further dissatisfaction with 
the regime, increasing perceptions of illegitimacy, uprisings and, ultimately, regime collapse 
(Huntington 1991: 55). Regime illegitimacy is therefore considered to be the “single most 
important lever” in regime collapse as, when the levers of persuasion become weak or 
disappear, regimes become reliant on coercive forms of power (Huntington 1991: 150). It is 
therefore  imperative  to  consider  the  role  of  regime  illegitimacy  when  developing  a 
theoretical causal framework with which to assess the collapse of the Mubarak regime.  14 
 
 
There  are  three  main  strategies,  or  tactics,  that  authoritarian  regimes  utilise  to  retain 
power and increase their legitimacy: the use of periodic elections; the creation of enemies 
external to the regime and population; and hereditary leadership selection (Schedler 2002).  
Authoritarian regimes do not hold periodic elections for the purpose of democratising their 
nations nor do they hold elections for the purpose of ensuring leaders are accountable to 
their populations (Schedler 2002; Geddes 2005). Rather, elections are used as a tool for 
gaining legitimacy, for showing a “...friendlier face while ensuring that the basic contours of 
the regime remain unchanged” (Brown 2003: 44). Huntington (1991: 47) asserts that many 
authoritarian regimes are compelled to present this “friendly face” and demonstrate their 
commitment to democratic structures and rhetoric in order to avoid being confronted by 
their own populations or international actors. Authoritarian regimes manipulate elections 
at four levels: during voter registration, electoral campaigning, election-day procedures, or 
during the final vote count and tabulation (Calingaert 2006). The manipulation of elections 
can however, lead to significant declines in regime legitimacy as, when election fraud and 
manipulation are exposed, the legitimacy of a regime is eroded both internally and in the 
international arena (Calingaert 2006: 139; Dix 1982: 562). The illegitimacy of the regime’s 
claim to power therefore becomes that much more patent and the regime loses its ability 
to effectively persuade its population that is has a legitimate right to rule (Dix 1982: 562).  
 
Authoritarian  regimes  also  try  to  shore  up  their  legitimacy  through  the  creation  of  an 
“external other” (Huntington 1991: 46). Through this tactic, regimes can gain efficacy by 
claiming  that  an  enemy,  external  to  the  regime,  presents  a  threat  to  the  national 
aspirations of the people (Huntington 1991: 460). Some regimes have appealed to their 
populations on the basis of nationalist or ideological grounds in order to obtain legitimacy 
(Huntington 1991), whilst others have declared states of emergency for substantial periods 
of time as a way to obtain legitimacy based on an external other (Goldstone 2011: 9). 
Regimes have also founded external others in religious rhetoric as a way to justify their use 
of  coercive  power  (Sedgewick  2010:  257).  Regimes  utilise  persuasive  power,  such  as 
propaganda,  in  such  contexts  to  convince  their  populations  that  coercive  power  is 
necessary to uphold the public morality of the state (Sedgewick 2010: 257). A key example 
of  this  could  be  a  regime  labelling  an  opposition  group  as  radical,  violent  or  fanatical 
thereby justifying the regime’s repression of such a group on the basis of it posing a threat 
to the population. Sedgewick (2010: 257) does note, however, that religious legitimacy can 
only be utilised occasionally by authoritarian regimes as it quickly becomes apparent to 15 
 
populations that religion is being used as a tool for justifying authoritarian rule. This can 
ultimately lead to increasing discontent (Goldstone 2011: 9). 
 
A  third  strategy  utilised  by  authoritarian  regimes  to  maintain  regime  legitimacy  is 
hereditary  leadership  selection  (Brownlee  2007).  Hereditary  leadership  selection  occurs 
when an authoritarian ruler hand-picks her/his successor, usually her/his eldest son, who is 
then groomed to take over the reins of power in the near future (Stacher 2011). Brownlee 
(2007) argues that hereditary succession is the preferred option for regime continuity as it 
ensures  the  continued  status  of  not  only  familial  relatives  but  also  extra-familial  elites 
within  the  ruling  party.  However,  hereditary  succession  strategies  are  a  “particularly 
difficult  challenge”  confronting  authoritarian  regimes  (Linz  1990:  146).  For  hereditary 
succession  to  be  effective  the  core  groups  within  the  ruling  elite  must  support  the 
succession and, when such groups do not, regime legitimacy can suffer considerably and 
opposition groups can be bolstered by regime dissidents (Stacher 2011).   
 
Despite  the  tactics outlined  above,  regime  legitimacy  has  also  been  found  to  naturally 
decline over time due to unrealised promises and the resultant increasing frustrations of 
the population (Huntington 1991: 48). Declines in regime legitimacy have also been found 
to occur when a regime actually fulfils its promises as, in a sense, it loses its purpose and 
the population has reduced reasons to continue its  support of the regime (Huntington 
1991: 55). Huntington (1991: 50) also asserts that regime legitimacy and ruler legitimacy 
are intrinsically linked. As such, a decline in regime legitimacy must also mean a decline in 
the perceived legitimacy of the regime leader. It is important to note though that regime 
collapse cannot be induced until the perceived legitimacy of the regime and its ruler are so 
damaged that the population consider it to be irredeemable (Goldstone 2011: 8). In many 
authoritarian regimes, especially in Egypt, the ruler is considered to be the epitome of the 
regime and therefore nothing less than a complete destruction of both the regime and the 
ruler would have been accepted by the population (Goldstone 2011). Essentially, nothing 
less than regime ruptura will do when populations become aware of the sheer illegitimacy 
of an authoritarian regime. 
 
Declines in regime legitimacy have also been argued to be intrinsically linked to regime 
performance as many of the coercive apparatuses and regime legitimation strategies are 
dependent  on  effective  regime  performance  (Bellin  2004).  Regime  performance 16 
 
encompasses the state’s economy, the presence of law and order in the state, the regime’s 
ability to maintain public order and the regime’s performance in areas such as human rights 
(Linz 1990: 146; Dix 1982: 561; Huntington 1991: 51). Unlike regimes that perform well, 
regimes that perform poorly are unable to translate their performance into credibility or 
legitimacy (Linz 1990: 146). Poor regime performance results in increases in the discontent 
of  the  population,  subsequent  increases  in  the  forming  of  opposition  groups  and  a 
reduction in the effectiveness of the regime’s ability to employ persuasive power tactics 
(Dix 1982: 559; Huntington 1991: 55; Linz 1990: 146).  
 
Poor regime performance is also measured through economic indicators, including a state’s 
year-to-year gross domestic product (GDP) growth, per capita income, the percentage of 
the population living in cities and population density (Epstein et al 2006: 557). Economic 
crises and decline threaten the survival of all forms of government, whether democratic or 
authoritarian (Geddes 1999: 135). When plunged into poverty, populations tend to assign 
blame to the regime in power and are more likely to demand change (Geddes 1999: 138). 
As  Gouveritch  (1992:  9)  argues,  if  “good  times  slake  the  propensity  to  contest  and 
challenge” then times of scarcity invigorate and inspire the masses to rise up and question 
regimes. Declines in a state’s economic climate lead to regime instability which is primarily 
caused by the gap between the expectations of the population and the regime’s ability to 
satisfy such expectations (Linz 1990: 147; Dix 1982: 560). Dix (1982: 560) argues that it is 
this “intolerable” gap which results in revolutions and subsequent collapses of regimes. 
Furthermore, poor economic performance can also directly impact on a regime’s ability to 
employ persuasive power tactics (Dix 1982). In periods of poor economic performance, 
broad groups of regime elites can no longer be provided with monetary rewards for their 
loyalty and, as a result, a regime can expect to experience some regime narrowing caused 
by defections. Essentially, when faced with economic decline, the regime may have to cut 
back on the inducements it offers and the persuasive power tactics it employs (Dix 1982). 
 
Defection of international allies and the military 
The legitimacy of authoritarian regimes is also validated, to an extent, through international 
structures, such as the provision of external aid and the development of alliances with 
other states (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 376). Authoritarian regimes are required to 
seek a higher level of external legitimacy than Western nations as, to date, there has been 
no Western polity which stands as a “legitimate example” for authoritarianism (Linz 1990: 
147). As such authoritarian regimes learn to speak a “democracy language” and use “donor 17 
 
talk”, both of which are forms of persuasive power, in order to gain some semblance of 
external legitimacy (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 376).  
 
The decline in a regime’s external legitimacy can occur as a result of a decline in internal 
legitimacy brought about by the actions of the regime (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004: 376; 
El-Ghazaly et al 2011). Abuses of human rights, corruption and election rigging have all 
been  argued  to  cause  significant  declines  in  a  regime’s  perceived  legitimacy  in  the 
international  arena  which,  in  turn,  undermines  the  effectiveness  of  a  regime’s  use  of 
persuasive power (El-Ghazaly et al 2011). Such declines in external legitimacy can also lead 
to changes in the foreign policies of external actors and allies (Dix 1982: 569). Changes in 
foreign policies undoubtedly play a role in regime collapse in two ways: through boosting 
the  anti-regime  and  possible  democratic  spirit  of  protestors  and  through  limiting  the 
choices available to the regime (Huntington 1991: 95; Lee 2009: 646).  
 
Changes can include the withholding of foreign aid, support for anti-regime protestors and 
the  provision  of  financial support  or  weaponry  to the  opposition  (Lee  2009: 646).  The 
regime  can  also  be  ostracised  by  the  international  community,  which  can  include 
suspension of  diplomatic relations,  expulsion  from  international  organizations  and  non-
recognition  (Lee  2009:  646).  Essentially,  foreign  policy  changes  can  hinder  a  regime’s 
survival as such changes can cause a shift in the cost-benefit scenarios that occur internal to 
the regime (Geddes 1999: 130). International pressure and foreign policy shifts can “turn 
the tide” in the favour of disenchanted protestors as Western powers can either “refuse to 
step  in”  to  defend  the  authoritarian  regime or  can  “constrain  [the  regime]  from  using 
maximum force to defend itself” against protestors. (Goldstone 2011: 8). In addition to 
constraining  the  choices  of  regime  leaders,  external  actors  can  also  actively  promote 
human rights and democracy by offering incentives to those who are willing to open up 
their societies and using sanctions and economic pressures on others (Huntington 1991: 
90).  
 
Interestingly, during the third wave of democracy in the 1970s, the US altered prominent 
aspects of its foreign policy agenda. This altered agenda was evidenced in speeches and 
statements made by US Presidents in which it was stated that human rights would be 
placed back on “the world agenda” (Huntington 1991: 92). In this way, changes in foreign 
policies  cannot  be  considered  to  be  solely  enacted  for  the  purpose  of  causing  regime 18 
 
illegitimacy. Indeed, foreign policy shifts can also occur as a result of the vested interests of 
external actors (Huntington 1991: 92). For example, if viewed through a Fukuyama-inspired 
lens,  Western  powers  may  see  a  shift  from  supporting  an  authoritarian  regime  as  an 
opportunity to bring about the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). Indeed, the structural 
constraints imposed by Western powers on authoritarian regimes may be a result of a 
regime’s  failure to  follow  a  path  of  “unilinear movement”  toward  capitalist democracy 
(Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004).  
 
Despite some foreign policy changes occurring when no decline in regime legitimacy has 
occurred,  it  can  still  be  argued  that  such  changes  undermine  the  coercive  power  of 
authoritarian regimes (Albrecht & Schlumberger 2004). By inducing a regime to have better 
respect for human rights or to progress towards actual democratic principles, the regime is 
therefore limited in its ability to use coercive power without delegitimising itself on an 
international level (Lee 2009). It should be noted though that foreign policy changes can 
only play a role in regime collapse if the external actor who makes such changes is crucial to 
or has some form of leverage over the regime (Lee 2009). Indeed, some scholars have 
identified that the withdrawal of support, most notably of the US, can only prove to be 
damaging when the US had previously been a significant source of support for the regime in 
the first instance (Dix 1982).  
 
The defection of regime allies and loss of support is not limited to external international 
actors  though.  The  defection  of  the  military  is  also  pivotal  to  any  theoretical  causal 
framework for regime collapse as it can quite literally obliterate the regime’s ability to use 
coercive  power  (Dix  1982;  Geddes  1999;  Huntington  1991).  Military  defection  from 
authoritarian  regimes  is  argued  to  be  largely  based  on  the  perceived  self-interests  of 
military officers (Dix 1982: 563). The interests of military officers are primarily founded on a 
desire for the survival and efficacy of the military as a whole and additionally based on 
concerns relating to officers’ assessments of how many other officers will defect or remain 
loyal to a regime (Geddes 1999: 126). Ultimately, in times of regime instability, the worst 
outcome for the military is considered to be civil war as armed forces often end up fighting 
one another which is considered to be counter-productive for military survival (Geddes 
1999: 126). The military will therefore avoid situations in which the likely end result will be 
civil war (Geddes 1999: 126).  
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 The perceived self-interests of officers can also influence the willingness of the military, or 
ultima ratio regum, to use their weapons on behalf of the regime (Huntington 1991: 198). 
By calling on the military to use violence against its own population, the regime increasingly 
isolates the military and begins to disintegrate its image as the embodiment of the national 
interest (Dix 1982: 565). This is not usually a position the military is comfortable with and 
can  lead  to  significant  resentment  toward  the  regime  and  its  rule  (Dix  1982:  565). 
Essentially, if a military defects from an authoritarian regime, the ability of the regime to 
therefore use coercive power is severely limited. The scope of the regime’s coercive power 
is diminished and, based on the ultima ratio regum of the military, the cohesion of the 
regime’s coercive power becomes non-existent. A good proxy measure for the withdrawal 
of the military from a regime is any refusal by the armed forces to stop protestors (Lee 
2009).  This  measure  is  also  particularly  relevant  if  the  authoritarian  regime  clearly 
expressed a preference for the military to use force against protestors (Lee 2009). 
 
Unified and broad opposition 
A  further  “decisive  factor”  in  regime  collapse  is  the  formation  of  a  united  and  broad 
opposition with shared motivations and goals (Ulfeder 2005; Dix 1982: 566). There is an 
abundance  of  literature  outlining  that  regime  collapse  is  most  likely  to  occur  when 
opposition groups encompass a “broad-based section of the population”, are composed of 
“average men and women, students and workers” and include all ethnic, religious and 
socio-economic groups (Goldstone 2011: 8; Linz 1990: 152). Essentially, unified opposition 
groups turn “into a greater whole which identifies itself as ‘the people’” and can exert 
strong pressures on a regime (Ulfeder 2005: 312). The more representative the opposition 
group is of the entire population, the less likely any segment of that population will be to 
tolerate violence used against the opposition group (Huntington 1991: 200). This ultimately 
undermines  the effectiveness  of  any  regime  propaganda  or  inducements  aimed  at  any 
section of the population, restricts the regime’s ability to employ a policy of divide and rule, 
and impedes the regime’s persuasive power (Ulfeder 2005: 312). However, one must look 
to historical factors, namely the opposition present during the formation of the regime, 
when considering the impact a broad opposition would have on regime collapse (Smith 
2005). If a regime begins its rule with little to no opposition present it is unlikely to build 
strong coalitions or invest in party institutions as it would if there were strong opposition 
(Smith 2005: 430). As such, when faced with broad uprisings which it has not encountered 
before, the regime is somewhat fragile and cannot effectively respond.  
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A  central  tactic  of  those  wishing  to  bring  about  regime  collapse  is  the  mass  rally  or 
demonstration which provides an opportunity for the opposition to “focus discontent…test 
the breadth of its support and…generate publicity”. However, there is little dissention in 
the literature regarding the necessity for such demonstrations to be non-violent in order to 
bring about regime collapse (Huntington 1991: 150; Dix 1982; Ulfeder 2005). This necessity 
is  based  on  the  notion  that  the  use  of  non-violent  protests,  in  comparison  to  violent 
protests, helps the opposition gain support from the military (Huntington 1991: 150). As 
Huntington (1991: 150) states, “…soldiers do not tend to be sympathetic to people who 
have been hurling Molotov cocktails at them”.  
 
Non-violent protests have also been argued to trigger the defection of the military from 
regimes  and  bolster  the  inspirations  of  the  opposition  (Huntington  1991:204;  Ulfeder 
2005). When faced with peaceful uprisings, authoritarian regimes can choose to respond in 
either  a  violent  or  non-violent manner  (Ulfeder 2005).  If  a  regime  chooses to  respond 
violently (i.e. use its coercive apparatus) the military may be ordered to use force against 
their own population; however, as noted above their willingness to do so is not guaranteed 
(Ulfeder 2005). Research has demonstrated a correlation between the ability of the military 
to identify with the individuals involved in peaceful uprisings, on either a social or ethnic 
level,  and  the  military’s  willingness  to  use  their  weapons  when  ordered  to  do  so 
(Huntington 1991: 198). The more representative of society those involved in non-violent 
mass demonstrations are the less likely that the military will be to use force against them 
(Huntington 1991: 198). In this way, non-violent protests carried out by a unified and broad 
opposition can also be seen to bring about substantial losses to the regime’s ability to use 
coercive  power  as  the  scope  and  cohesion  of  the  regime’s  coercive  apparatus  can  be 
fragmented. 
 
Strategic use of Social Media by the Opposition 
Authoritarian regimes are experts in what has been referred to as “technocratic electronic 
dictatorship” (Huntington 1991: 11). Authoritarian rule is often legitimated through the use 
of manipulated media and information, with many regimes in the 21
st century assigning the 
task of information control and propaganda dispersion to specific ministries within the 
regime (Kubba 2000: 88). However, social media has become a proverbial double edged 
sword for regimes as they are not the only ones using it strategically (Haass 2011: 115). The 
rise of mass communication and social media has allowed populations under authoritarian 
rule to communicate with the outside world, engage with different cultures and ideas and 21 
 
be exposed to values not akin to their own (Kubba 2000: 88). Populations can effectively 
reshape their opinions and learn about alternative forms of government (Kubba 2000). 
Such access to information inhibits the influence that pro-regime propaganda can have on a 
population (Kubba 2000). 
 
However, social media plays a much greater role in the collapse of regimes than that of 
mere access to information. For protestors, the strategic use of social media has allowed 
for  an  effective  method  of  communication  to  organise  demonstrations  and  evade 
authorities  thereby  limiting  the  extent  to  which  regimes  can  actually  use  violence  or 
exercise their coercive powers (Khoury 2011). Choudhary et al (2012) argue that social 
media can also allow anti-regime movements to gain “critical mass”. In this way, social 
media can aid the literal coalescing of a broad opposition against an authoritarian regime 
and  can  provide  a “virtual  sounding  board  for  resonating  opinions…[and]  views”  (Scott 
2012: 1). Anti-regime sentiments can be vented on social media sites thereby undermining 
regime legitimacy and causing the regime to lose the effectiveness of its persuasive power 
(Haass 2011: 116).  
 
Social media has also been argued to further increase the likelihood of emulation effects 
(Kubba 2000). Emulation effects, which are also referred to in the literature as snowballing, 
the contagion effect and the domino effect, occur when the collapse of a regime in one 
nation inspires the uprisings in another nation (Almond et al 1973: 628; Ward et al 1996: 5). 
During the third wave of democracy in the 1970s, emulation effects performed two very 
important functions (Huntington 1991: 100). Firstly, the collapse of a regime in one nation 
illustrated to those disenchanted groups in other nations that authoritarian regimes could 
actually  be  brought  to  an  end  (Huntington  1991:  101).  Essentially,  emulation  effects 
showed populations “that it could be done” (Huntington 1991: 101). Secondly, emulation 
effects showed “how it could be done”; individuals in other nations had an example to 
follow, could imitate the techniques of previous demonstrators and be aware of possible 
dangers that needed to be avoided (Huntington 1991: 101; Kitschelt 1992: 1033). Social 
media essentially increases the chance of emulation effects occurring as populations have 
greater access to finding out that regime collapse can occur and also be exposed to the 
tactics of successful demonstrators. In this way, social media exposes the illegitimacy of not 
just one, but all authoritarian regimes and undermines the chances of the regime’s exercise 
of persuasive power being successful.  22 
 
 
Social media has one further impact on regime collapse. Social media has allowed societies, 
which once appeared closed to the Western world, to be opened (Kuba 2000: 88).  As 
Shirky (2011) argues, the secrets of closed societies become public truths through the use 
of social media. In effect, the perceptions, grievances and demands of protestors can be 
made apparent to Western nations who can, in turn, express their sympathy and support. 
Extensive coverage of the illegitimacy of an authoritarian regime, the associated protests 
and  subsequent  regime  crackdowns  and  use  of  coercive  power  may  also  incite  the 
populations of Western nations to call on their governments for some form of intervention 
(Shirky  2011).  In  short,  if  protests  are  well  publicised,  Western  powers  are  unable  to 
declare ignorance. Such publicity could also result in international pressure being placed on 
the regime and lead to detrimental changes in foreign policies, such as loss of international 
aid.  
 
Theoretical causal framework 
From the above literature review, the theoretical causal framework that unfolds is that 
declines in regime legitimacy can be brought about through the same strategies used to 
gain legitimacy and can also occur as a result of poor regime performance. Such declines 
limit  the  effectiveness  of  a  regime’s  persuasive  power  and  regimes  are  more  likely  to 
employ increasingly coercive and repressive forms of power in an attempt to regain control. 
The defection of international allies was also argued to occur as a result of internal declines 
in legitimacy and through actions of the regime which included human rights abuses and 
election  manipulation.  However,  international  allies  sometimes  change  their  stances 
toward authoritarian regimes as a result of vested interests or in an effort to further the 
cause of capitalist democracy. Regardless of the cause of the changes in foreign policy, it 
was argued that such shifts limit the persuasive power of regimes due to a loss of external 
legitimacy  and  can  also  result  in  the  regime  being  unable  to  broaden  the  scope of  its 
coercive apparatus through intervention by pro-regime international actors when uprisings 
occur.  
 
Military defection was shown to be based on the military officers’ perceived self-interests 
and their willingness to utilise force against their own population when ordered to do so by 
the  regime.  Such  defection  significantly  reduces  the  scope  of  the  regime’s  coercive 
apparatus. The coalescing of a broad and unified opposition that protests peacefully was 
also shown to assist in the defection of the military, thereby undermining both the scope 23 
 
and  cohesion  of  the  regime’s  coercive  apparatus.  Additionally,  a  broad  and  unified 
opposition inhibits the regime’s use of persuasive power as the regime is unable to offer 
inducements or reforms that will satisfy everyone.  
  
The strategic use of social media was also said to allow protestors to avoid the regime’s use 
of coercive power by allowing effective communication as to where regime authorities are. 
Social media also allows protestors to organise demonstrations, gain knowledge in relation 
to  alternative  forms  of  government,  gain  knowledge  about  prior  regime  collapses  and 
provides an open forum in which to voice opinions. Effectively, the use of social media in 
these ways inhibits the success of pro-regime propaganda and undermines the regime’s 
persuasive  powers.  Social  media  can  also  expose  the  true  illegitimacy  of  authoritarian 
regimes both internally and in the international arena. 
 
EGYPT: THE RISE OF THE LAST PHARAOH 
The Mubarak regime: A Brief Background 
Hosni Mubarak commenced his career as a professional soldier (Arafat 2009: 24). He was 
trained in the Air Force and received commendations for his actions in the 1973 war with 
Israel (Arafat 2009: 24). In 1975, he was appointed as Vice President by Anwar al-Sadat, 
then  President  of  Egypt,  at  the  age  of  forty-seven  (Arafat  2009:  24).  During  his  vice 
presidency, Mubarak built a reputation as a man devoid of any presidential aspirations and 
avoided power politics whenever possible (Arafat 2009: 24). On 14 October 1981, Hosni 
Mubarak ascended to power in the wake of Anwar al-Sadat’s assassination. To a large 
extent, apart from declaring a state of emergency upon his appointment, Mubarak adopted 
his predecessor’s model and initially refrained from discarding any members of the cabinet 
he had inherited (Stacher 2012: 5; Arafat 2009: 25).   
 
Mubarak’s first four years in power largely revolved around him slowly revealing both his 
domestic and foreign policy changes which included the expulsion of corrupt ministers, the 
recruitment of young, reform-minded technocrats and he began to increase government 
spending on subsidised housing and medicine (Arafat 2009: 25). He also began to replace 
the cabinet with his sycophants and cronies, most of whom had no political experience, and 
replaced the Prime Minister four times in five years (Arafat 2009: 28). However, Mubarak 
truly solidified his rule in the 1987 elections with a reported 97% of the Egyptian vote (New 
York Times 1 February 2011). 24 
 
 
 Mubarak subsequently began to increase spending on the regime’s coercive apparatus and 
gave the police force the right to arrest and detain individuals without charge for suspected 
dissent  or  regime  criticism  (Brownlee  2012).  Mubarak’s  own  people  began  to  fear  the 
ubiquitous presence of the police as brutal beatings and torture were not uncommon nor 
were deaths in custody (Brownlee 2012). The regime’s coercive apparatus was sturdy with 
the military backing the regime and the police force and Mubarak’s own thugs keeping the 
population, dissenters and political critics in check (Brownlee 2012). Mubarak’s coercive 
apparatus was not used solely on the population though. In 2005, the regime disqualified 
1,700 judges from overseeing the elections (Collombier 2012: 17). Judges were told to sign 
off on the rigging of the election and were also forced, through threats of violence, to 
remain silent about the attacks that occurred on voters (Collombier 2012: 17). Notably over 
165 assaults were perpetrated against judges by Mubarak’s thugs during the 2005 election 
period with only ten of these assaults investigated at a later date (Collombier 2012: 17). The 
military was also restored by Mubarak to a privileged place in Egyptian society, which it had 
lost during the reign of Sadat, received increasing salaries and benefits and was included in 
development  projects  to  boost  its  involvement  in  the  economic  sectors  of  the  state 
(Brownlee 2012).  
 
Mubarak’s development of a strong persuasive apparatus also followed and  he quickly 
became adept at controlling the media and expanding his “plethora of TV mouth pieces” to 
broadcast pro-regime propaganda (Darwish 2011). The government bought stock of three 
of the major newspapers in Egypt and was solely responsible for appointing the editors-in-
chief  (Freedom  House  2012).  By  1999,  Mubarak  had  established  a  Ministry  of 
Communication of Information which controlled and managed the use of the internet in 
Egypt and the government also had a strong grip on internet service providers (Freedom 
House 2012). 
 
 Mubarak also quickly began to violate the long-held unspoken agreement between the 
regime and its population for political liberalisation, which had first been initiated by Sadat 
in the mid-1970s, by imposing considerable limits on opposition political parties (Shehata 
2011:  29).  During  the  1990s,  Mubarak  set  his  sights  on  the  supposed  Islamic  militant 
opposition  by  waging  political  war  against  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  and  forcing  them 
underground (Shehata 2011: 30). By 2006, Mubarak had declared that he would hold the 25 
 
presidency for life and by the 2010 elections, all opposition groups within Egypt, not just 
the Muslim Brotherhood, were effectively denied representation in parliament due to the 
extent  of  election  manipulation  (Shehata  2011:  29).    It  is  within  this  context  that  the 
uprisings occurred. 
 
The Uprisings 
On  25  January  2011,  the Egyptian  people  had  finally  had  enough.  Protestors  filled  the 
streets of Cairo voicing their objections to the corrupt and despotic thirty-year regime of 
Mubarak (Freedom House 2011). Shortly afterwards, in an attempt to regain control and cut 
all communications between protestors and sympathisers, Mubarak blocked all internet 
access  and  cut  all  mobile  phone  services  for  six  days  in  “an  unprecedented  display  of 
censorship”  (Darwish  2011).  Several  days  later,  with  little  decrease  in  the  number  of 
protesters, Mubarak announced the appointment of Omar Suleiman as Vice President and 
dismissed  his  entire  Cabinet.  However,  protestors  continued  to  call  for  Mubarak’s 
resignation. 
 
On 1 February 2011, Mubarak announced in a televised speech that he would not run in the 
elections scheduled in September (Darwish 2011). Mubarak also stated that it was not in 
“[his] nature to betray the trust or give up [his] responsibilities and duties” and that he 
would “work in the remaining months of [his] term to ensure a peaceful transfer of power” 
(Darwish  2011).  Following  Mubarak’s  lacklustre  speech,  protestors  continued  to  chant 
“Irhal, irhal”, “Go, go” signalling their non-acceptance of his offered concessions (Darwish 
2011). It should have become obvious to the Mubarak regime at this point that half-hearted 
attempts at reform were not going to suffice (Darwish 2011).  
 
On 10 February 2011, Mubarak announced that he would delegate all of his power to Vice 
President Omar Suleiman but mentioned nothing in relation to tendering his resignation 
(Darwish 2011). Protestors were again outraged and vowed to expand their presence in 
Egyptian streets. It appeared that protestors were unwilling to accept anything other than 
Mubarak’s resignation as he had come to represent everything they felt was wrong with 
their country – unemployment, corruption, nepotism and repression (Darwish 2011). Finally 
on 11 February 2011, despite several attempts at offering reforms, instigating violence 
amongst protestors and repressing the uprising, the Mubarak regime collapsed. Suleimain 
announced Mubarak’s formal resignation and the handover of all powers to the Egyptian 
military. Following this announcement, protestors celebrated into the night and through 26 
 
the next day with many holding signs that stated, “Yesterday I was a demonstrator, today I 
build Egypt” (Freedom House 2011).  
 
MUBARAK’S PUZZLING COLLAPSE 
Constant Declining Regime Legitimacy: The Exposure of Mubarak’s Illicit Power  
As is evident from the above outline of Mubarak’s rule prior to the uprisings, declining 
regime legitimacy had been occurring in Egypt for some time and was intrinsically linked to 
the way in which Mubarak chose to rule (Goldstone 2011). Mubarak’s rule was solidly 
based on the three legitimacy tactics that were outlined earlier in this thesis. Mubarak’s 
efforts to ensure overwhelming majority votes were poorly concealed and were becoming 
gradually  more  evident  with  each  election  (Albrecht  and  Schlumberger  2004:  381). 
Ultimately, the façade of democratic elections created by the Mubarak regime led to a 
growing disenchantment with the status quo and, a complete disbelief by the majority of 
the population of any pro-regime propaganda (Darwish 2011: 20; Paciello 2011: 10). The 
2005  and  2010  elections  blatantly  involved  mass  rigging  (The  Economist  29  November 
2010). In the 2005 elections, government vehicles were used to transport public employees 
to voting stations where they were expected to vote for Mubarak (Nagi 2008). Votes were 
also bought in the rural areas and poorer suburbs through monetary inducements of thirty-
five  Egyptian  pounds  and  thousands  of  illegal  votes  in  favour  of  Mubarak  from  non-
registered citizens were allowed to be counted (Nagi 2008). On 29 November 2010, The 
Economist reported that the 2010 elections had been far worse than the 2005 elections due 
to a sheer lack of “...finesse in the rigging of the vote...” in which opposition candidates’ 
names were removed from ballots, election officials filled out piles of blank ballots and 
regime thugs stood intimidating voters with machetes.  Overall, Mubarak was said to have 
won 93.3% of the vote (Stacher 2012: 7).  
 
Mubarak was also attempting to utilise the strategy of heredity leadership succession. In 
2006, the Egyptian Daily Star reported that a high ranking NDP member had hinted that 
Gamal Mubarak, the son of Hosni Mubarak, would be put forward as a candidate for the 
2011 elections. However, a 2010 US Embassy report released on Wikileaks identified that, 
“...a key stumbling block for any effort to bring Gamal Mubarak to the presidency would be 
the  military...Gamal Mubarak  did  not  serve  as  a  military  officer...and  unlike  his  father, 
cannot  take the military’s support for granted...”. Not only did Gamal Mubarak lack the 
support of the military, but the Egyptian population were humiliated and “disgusted with 27 
 
the idea” of Mubarak bequeathing power onto his son (Stein 2012: 46). No matter which 
way his son’s leadership succession was portrayed or propagated, the people of Egypt were 
not convinced nor were the military.  
 
Mubarak also utilised the regime legitimation tactic of creating an external other for much 
of  his  rule.  In  Egypt,  the  Islamist  movement  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  was  severely 
restricted by the Mubarak regime from the mid-1990s in participating in politics and was 
often portrayed in the official media as a violent and radical opposition party (Kubba 2000). 
In reality, Mubarak was merely seeking political legitimacy by presenting his regime, both 
to the international community and to his population, in comparison to that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as “the lesser of two evils” (Darwish 2011: 21). Mubarak also extended the 
use of Emergency Laws every three years following his appointment as President in 1981 
(Nagi 2008: 11). Mubarak justified the extension of these laws to the Egyptian people by 
arguing that it was necessary in order to “confront terrorism and protect democracy and 
stability” (Nagi 2008: 12; Goldstone 2011: 9). Mubarak also used the violent clashes that 
often  occurred  between  Muslims  and  Copts  to  validate  these  laws  which  effectively 
suspended constitutional rights, extended police powers and legalised censorship (Elad-
Altman 2006: 9). The Mubarak regime also, on several occasions, took it upon itself to be 
the protector of so-called public morality and religion (Sedgwick 2010).  Examples include 
the prosecution of homosexuals in the 2001 Queen Boat case as well as the case of Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zeid, a liberal Islamic theologian, who, following trial, was declared an apostate, 
removed from his rank of full professor and declared to be divorced from his wife (Albrecht 
& Schlumberger 2004).  
 
Mubarak’s  use  of  these  legitimation  tactics  was  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  and 
containing legitimate political activities in addition to legitimating his rule (Nagi 2018: 12). 
Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood, as one of the largest and most influential Islamic parties in 
Egypt, posed a significant threat to the rule of the Mubarak regime, the increasing use of 
illicit  legitimation  tactics  by  the  Mubarak  regime  had  deeper  roots  than  merely  being 
concerned  over  political  challenges  (Nagu  2008:  12).  The  regime’s  legitimacy  had  been 
declining for a significant period and Mubarak’s legitimacy as the next rightful ruler in line, 
following Sadat’s assassination in 1981, had long since faded (Al-Awadi 2004: 11). He was 
therefore attempting to revive his stagnated legitimacy through the use of these tactics 28 
 
which became increasingly apparent to the Egyptian population and, in turn, highlighted 
the cracks in the regime’s  “ruling edifice”  (Goldstone 2011: 29).  
 
The Mubarak regime’s performance also attributed to a gradual decline in its legitimacy. 
Economically, the Mubarak regime performed quite well leading up to the 2011 protests 
(Shehata  2011).  Egypt’s  GDP  was  growing  dynamically  and  between  2010  and  2011 
increased  by  approximately  US$11  billion  (World  Bank  Development  Indicators,  2012). 
During the world financial crisis, Egypt’s GDP did not fall; however, its annual economic 
growth rate slowed from 7.2% to 4.6%, which was still surprisingly good when compared to 
other countries (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011: 140). Egyptian incomes were stable during the 
2010 and 2011 period, with the average income at US$5890 in 2009, US$6030 in 2010 and 
US$6160 in 2011 (World Bank Development Indicators 2012). With regards to poverty in 
Egypt, the Mubarak regime managed to lower the percentage of those subject to extreme 
poverty (those living on less than $1.25 a day) to less than 2% (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011: 
147). However, individuals subject to moderate poverty (those living on less than $2 a day) 
was  relatively  high  with  approximately  35-40%  of  Egyptians  falling  into  this  category 
(Kapadia 2011: 28; Stacher 2012: 7). 
 
Indeed, Egypt’s population had long been suffering while Mubarak and his cronies were 
getting fat from the profits of economic growth (Goldstone 2011: 11). Stacher (2012: 6) 
argues  that,  beneath  the  international  recognition  of  economic  growth  lay  a  country 
“weighed under by a deteriorating infrastructure, abject poverty and a dwindling social 
safety net”. In terms of employment, the last decade of Mubarak’s reign was signified by 
slowly  phasing  out  any  patronage  policies  to  subsidise  workers  and  their  families 
(Goldstone 2011). One of these phased out policies guaranteed Egyptian college graduates 
job placements; however, after being discontinued, educated Egyptians were “ten times 
more likely to have no job” when compared to those with only elementary educations 
(Goldstone 2011). Shehata (2011) asserts that state expenditure on social programs and 
services, which included education, health care and housing, was drastically reduced to the 
point of stagnation.  
 
The economic performance of the Mubarak regime was also severely undermined by surges 
in food prices in 2008 and 2010. Protests occurred as a result of food price increases, with 
the focus being on a decrease in living standards (Saif 2011: 107). Egyptian bloggers who 29 
 
supported  the  protest  movement  of  textile  workers  against  food  price  increases  also 
launched a Facebook campaign called the “April 6 Movement” in 2008 (Kinsman 2011). 
According to the Facebook page of The April 6 Movement, the group “gathered…in the 
renewal of hope…in the probability of mass action in Egypt which allowed all kind [sic] of 
youth from different backgrounds, society, classes all over Egypt to emerge…and reach for 
the democratic future that overcomes…occlusion of political and economic prospects that 
[Egyptian] society is suffering these days” (Harvey 2012: 2). Whilst generally associated with 
young  and  technologically  savvy  Egyptians,  the  April  6
  Movement  was  equally  popular 
amongst other sections of the population, with 69% of 30-49 year olds and 70% of people 
50 and older supporting this movement (Shahine 2011: 2). 
 
In terms of other areas of regime performance, human rights abuses were rife in Egypt 
during Mubarak’s reign. A Human Rights Watch Report entitled ‘Work on Him Until He 
Confesses’  (2010),  indicates  that many  Egyptians, whether suspected  dissidents  or  not, 
were subject to arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, torture and brutality at the hands of 
police.  Freedom  House  (2012)  has  also  rated  the  civil  liberties  and  political  rights  of 
Egyptians consistently, since 2005, as 6 and 5, respectively (1 representing the most free 
and 7 representing the least free) with an overall freedom rating of 5.5 and a status of ‘not 
free’. In terms of corruption, Transparency International (2010) found Egypt to score 2.9 on 
the Corruption Perception Index during the 2010 to 2011 period, with scores ranging from 
0, which denotes highly corrupt, to 10, which denotes very clean. Egypt ranked 80
th in the 
world in 2010 in terms of corruption and was argued to have “prolific political corruption, 
collusion  between  the  public  and  private  sector,  as  well  as  widespread  nepotism” 
(Transparency  International  Report  2011).  A  telling  example  of  the  corruption  of  the 
Mubarak regime has been the amassing of the Mubaraks’ wealth which is estimated to be 
between US$40 billion and US$70 billion (Lesch 2012). Following his overthrow, Mubarak 
and his sons were all charged with illegal profiteering and the embezzlement of public 
funds, including cash and gold (Lesch 2012). As the former head of an investigative unit 
within the Ministry of the Interior has stated, "the Mubarak era will be known … as the era 
of thieves. His official business [was] the looting of public money" (Lesch 2012: 40). 
 
It is evident from the above discussion then that the Mubarak regime’s performance was 
feeble. Additionally, the perception of the regime’s performance was also dire (Shahine 
2011: 2). After surveying Egyptians on their thoughts of the state of their country, Shahine 30 
 
(2011: 2) found that, in 2010, only 20% of the population perceived the performance of the 
regime to be good. The regime was effectively failing in the eyes of the Egyptian people and 
losing  legitimacy  in  a  rapid  manner.  With  an  apparent  feeling  of  declining  regime 
legitimacy, Mubarak’s regime became increasingly heavy handed and progressively began 
to rely solely on the regime’s coercive power to maintain control (El-Ghobashy 2011). An 
evident example of the regime’s increasing use of coercive power occurred in June 2010 
when a young Alexandrian man named Khaled Sa’id was dragged from an internet café and 
beaten to death by police officers in broad daylight reportedly for his posting of a video on 
YouTube  which  showed  police  officers  dividing  the  proceeds  of  a  drug  raid  amongst 
themselves (El-Ghobashy 2011). Egyptians were horrified and this incident was said to have 
further galvanised public opinion of the illegitimacy of the Mubarak regime which was 
evidenced by the Facebook group “We are all Khaled Sa’id” (El-Ghobashy 2011). A review of 
Facebook outlines that this group’s cause was “not just Khaled Said’s brutal torture to 
death. Our opponents are not just the two policemen who tortured Khaled to death. We 
are standing up for the many Khaled Sa’ids who were and are still being tortured in Egypt” 
(Facebook 2012). This group gained approximately 4,800 followers in the ten days after its 
creation and, by the end of 2010, had approximately 350,000 followers (Brownlee 2012: 
141).  
 
Whilst declining regime legitimacy played a noteworthy role in bringing about the uprisings 
that led to the collapse of the Mubarak regime, it cannot be said to have definitively caused 
the collapse of the regime (Stacher 2012). Rather, during the 2011 uprisings the already de-
legitimated  Mubarak  regime  was  unable  to  regain  any  form  of  legitimacy  and  was 
ultimately  considered  by  its  population  to  be  irredeemable  (Goldstone  2011).  The 
protracted  use  of  legitimation  tactics  undermined  the  regime’s  attempts  at  persuasive 
power and it began to rely solely on coercive power. This increasing use of coercive power 
led to significant disillusionment of the population and uprisings which ultimately exposed 
the fact that Mubarak did not have a legitimate right to rule Egypt nor to exercise coercive 
forms of power (Goldstone 2011). 
 
Foreign Policy Shifts: No Longer Washington’s Man in Cairo 
For many years, Egypt enjoyed strong support from the United States (Saif 2011). The key 
facets of the US-Egyptian relationship included Mubarak’s suppression of Islamists within 
Egypt, his promise to keep the Suez Canal open and his continuation of the March 1979 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Doran 2011). Remarkably, in 2001 US Secretary of State, Colin 31 
 
Powell, even commented that Egypt’s heavy handed domestic security approach at keeping 
Islamic  fundamentalism  suppressed  was  a  model  for  emulation  (Brownlee  2002:  13). 
Essentially, Mubarak was “Washington’s man in Cairo” and the US, in return, provided 
billions of dollars in economic assistance and aid (Cook 2011).  
 
However, in 2002 a minor shift in the US’ foreign policy occurred. On 14 August 2002, the 
Bush administration announced that Egypt would not receive any additional US aid, beyond 
the US$2 billion promised annually in the 1978 Camp David Peace Accord (Brownlee 2002: 
13). This shift occurred as a result of the imprisonment of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an Egyptian 
who held US citizenship, for allegations of defaming Egypt and was an unprecedented step 
by the US in linking its foreign assistance to democratic political reforms (Brownlee 2002: 
13).  This  shift  effectively  meant  that  if  the  Mubarak  regime  wished  to  have  external 
legitimacy  it  would  need  to  limit  its  use  of  coercive  power  (Brownlee  2002:  13).  As 
Brownlee (2012: 88) argues, “all eyes were on Egypt…it was hard for the regime to be too 
heavy handed”.  This stance appeared to continue, albeit on a much subtler scale, with 
George W. Bush hinting that Mubarak should hold competitive and legislative presidential 
elections in 2005 by stating that Mubarak should “show the way toward democracy in the 
Middle East” (Brownlee 2012: 89).    
 
However, Bush did not push this matter with Mubarak and US criticisms of the lack of 
political openness in Egypt were largely kept silent in favour of Egypt’s assistance in helping 
to  achieve  the  US  security  agenda  (Brownlee  2012).  Indeed,  Bush’s  relationship  with 
Mubarak flourished following the commencement of the ‘war on terror’. The US became 
dependent on Egypt to interrogate and detain alleged Al-Qaeda suspects, assist in guiding 
US aircraft through Egyptian airspace and participate in intelligence sharing and joint covert 
operations (Brownlee 2012). In effect, during the ‘war on terror’ the US needed all the 
support it could muster from its strongest Arab ally. As Brownlee (2012: 8) notes, assistance 
in this regard served US interests much more than democracy in Egypt ever could.  
 
Obama’s inauguration brought about a “subtle and non-interventionist approach” toward 
democracy in the region and Egypt largely continued to enjoy US support (Gerges 2012: 4). 
Obama attempted to deepen the US’ diplomatic ties with Egypt by claiming it to be the key 
in  the  pursuit  of  a  two-state  solution  for  Palestine  and  Israel  (Brownlee  2012:  134). 
However, President Barack Obama’s voicing of his preference for open governments, which 32 
 
was evidenced in his 2009 Cairo speech, was viewed as a subtle and implicit criticism of 
Hosni Mubarak and other Arab autocrats (Gerges 2012). Indeed, some scholars have argued 
that Obama’s speech provided inspirational fodder for the beginnings of the Arab Spring 
revolutions as it appeared to be a verbal undertaking by the US to support those who 
sought to rise up against authoritarian regimes to achieve human rights (Anderson 2011). 
As Anderson (2011) argues, Obama’s speech “...set the expectations for how the United 
States would respond to [the uprisings]” when he stated that the ability to speak one’s 
mind, to have a say in how you are governed and to have the freedom to live as you 
choose, are not exclusively “...American ideas; they are human rights...that is why [the 
United  States]  will  support  them  everywhere”.  However,  it  was  not  until  the  actual 
uprisings occurred that the US shifted its foreign policy toward Mubarak. As the uprisings 
intensified in the first week of February 2011, the Obama administration explicitly asserted 
that there should be a change of ruler and, in doing so, abandoned its Egyptian ally (Gerges 
2012: 5). 
 
 Despite its positive relations with the US, Egypt’s relations with other international actors 
were strained. With its suspected involvement in practices of extraordinary rendition and 
the  illegal  torture  of  terrorist  suspects,  the  Mubarak  regime  quickly  lost  any  external 
legitimacy it had gained through its ties with the US (Stein 2012). International actors, such 
as  the  United  Nations  and  Human  Rights  Watch,  had  vocally  disapproved  of  Egypt’s 
involvement in extraordinary rendition and warned against the significant declines it should 
expect  in  its  international  “moral  credibility”  (Malinowski  2007:  1).  Reserves  of 
international moral credibility are imperative in times of regime crisis, as it is upon the basis 
of  such  reserves  that  international  actors  will  offer  support  or  assistance  (Malinowski 
2007).  
 
Essentially, Egypt’s external legitimacy and moral credibility were so damaged that, once 
uprisings occurred, Mubarak found himself with “no powerful international friends willing 
to risk much on his behalf” (Stein 2012: 49). As noted above, the US in particular was 
reluctant to intervene and urged the dictator to hand over power to the military (Stein 
2012: 50). However, Arab world responses to the Egyptian uprisings varied. Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, Kuwait and Palestine all continued to express their verbal support for the Mubarak 
regime by referring to the protestors as “infiltrators” attempting to cause instability and 
insecurity (CNN 27 February 2011). Israel’s President, Shimon Peres, also verbalised his 33 
 
support  by  stating  his  great  respect  for  President  Mubarak,  however,  conditioned  this 
statement by asserting that, “I don’t say everything that he did was right” (Reuters 31 
January 2011). In contrast, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called Mubarak a 
“traitor dictator” due to Mubarak’s prior ties to the US and offered his support to the 
protestors as his “brothers in religion” (Christian Science Monitor 4 February 2011). Iraq’s 
response was similar to that of Iran with Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki, asserting that the 
Egyptian people have “the right to express what they want without being persecuted” and 
that it is “intolerable” and “change is necessary” when a leader “rules for 30 or 40 years” 
(BBC 5 February 2011).  
 
Despite the varied Arab responses to the Egyptian uprisings, Mubarak’s overall external 
power to persuade the international community that he was a ruler worthy of being backed 
proved ineffective and weak  with only a minority of nations willing to offer little more than 
verbal  support  (Stein  2012:  50).  Mubarak  was  also  unable  to  increase  his  coercive 
apparatus as it was evident very quickly that he would not be gaining any military support 
from international actors (Stein 2012: 50). 
 
The Defection of the Military: The Protector of the Egyptian People 
The military in Egypt had long been held, by both the Egyptian population and officers 
within the military, as the protector of the national interest and the defender of the people 
(Kinsman 2011; Gearon 2011: 41).  The military’s guardian role was self-assigned during the 
1952 Egyptian Revolution when the Free Officers Movement, led by Gamal Abdul-Nasser, 
seized  power  from  King  Farouk,  freed  Egypt  from  foreign  interference  and  restored 
Egyptian pride (Thornhill 2004: 892). Since that revolution, all of Egypt’s rulers have come 
from the military and have relied heavily on it for support and backing (Martinin & Taylor 
2011: 129). 
 
As noted earlier, the defection of the military from a regime is most clearly evidenced when 
the regime has called on the military to stop protestors using force and the military is 
unwilling to do so (Lee 2009). In the case of Egypt, the military’s defection was obvious as it 
snubbed  Mubarak’s  calls  for  the  use  of  violence  against  protestors.  At  4.45pm  on  
28 January 2011, the military was called on to restore order and peace, following violent 
actions by riot police and other elements of security forces of the regime (Gearon 2011: 
41). Upon arriving in the streets, the military announced that it would no longer protect the 
regime but would rather serve the people of Egypt (Nasser 2011). Galal Nasser, a reporter 34 
 
for a local Egyptian online newspaper, Al-Ahram Weekly, reported on 14 April 2011 that 
demonstrators were assured that “[the military] would not turn a single rifle, mortar or 
tank against a civilian…its function was to protect the nation [and] the people”. Essentially, 
the  military  did  not  hinder  or  repress  the  revolution  that  demonstrators  were  so 
desperately  trying  to  achieve  despite  orders  by  Mubarak  to  turn  its  weapons  on  the 
Egyptian population.  
 
Some observers have noted that, due to the defection of the military, the uprisings stood 
on two legs; the military and the people (Al-Ahram Weekly 20 April 2011), and have argued 
that the military and the protestors were, “in reality as well as in rhetoric”, id wahida (one 
hand) (Stein 2012: 47). However, other scholars have identified the somewhat ambiguous 
role assumed by the military and stated that the reasons behind the military defection 
appear to not be solely based on altruistic grounds (Martini & Taylor 2011). Indeed, the 
military clearly had self-perceived interests revolving around its own survival and avoiding 
civil  war.  The  military  and  its  officers  were  cognisant  that  they  would  become  the 
“guardians of the transition” if they allowed protestors to topple the regime of Mubarak 
(Stacher 2012: 11). In a statement from the Egyptian military, which was relayed to the 
population by a senior military spokesman on 31 January 2011, the military stressed that  
its presence on the streets was for the safety of the Egyptian people and that it would “not 
allow  the  safety  and  security  of  the  country  to  be  tampered  with”  (Stein  2012:  47). 
Effectively, by supporting protestors, the military could “regain its governing glory” while 
also taking the credit for “nobly steering the country out of crisis” (Stacher 2012: 11). Thus, 
the  military’s  defection  from  the  Mubarak  regime  appears  to  have  been  based  on 
instrumental reasons. 
 
However, the defection of the military from the regime was not the only blow to Mubarak’s 
coercive apparatus. Indeed, Mubarak soon also lost the support of the police with many 
failing to arrive at work whilst other police officers handed in their badges and resigned 
(Lawson 2012: 14). Therefore, it is evident that both the Egyptian military and a large 
segment  of  the  Egyptian  police  were  unwilling  to  use  their  weapons  on  behalf  of  the 
regime. As a result, the cohesion of the Mubarak regime’s coercive apparatus was damaged 
as officers were unwilling to comply with Mubarak’s directions (Stacher 2012: 11). The 
scope  of  Mubarak’s  coercive  apparatus  to  utilise  coercive  power  was  also  significantly 
reduced. The defection of the military and police led to a shift in the balance of power 35 
 
between ruler and ruled and protestors suddenly gained a significant increase in the scope 
of their coercive apparatus (El-Ghobashy 2011). It should be noted that Mubarak did still 
have the compliance and willingness of his thugs to exercise violence, however, when these 
thugs perpetrated violence on peaceful protestors, the military intervened and the thugs 
were soon dispersed (Al Ahram Weekly 14 April 2011). In this way, the Mubarak regime was 
forced to rely solely on its use of persuasive power to regain control of Egypt. As noted 
earlier, in order to regain control solely on the basis of persuasive power, a ruler must 
possess significant oratory and political talents (Huntington 1986: 345). Mubarak, however, 
did not possess such talents (Sedgewick 2010: 261). 
 
This lack of talent was clearly evidenced by Mubarak’s choice of language in speeches to his 
nation during the uprisings. Mubarak came across as strangely defiant in all of his speeches 
and offered little more than “drip-drip concessions” (Darwish 2011). This was largely due to 
Mubarak’s own perception of himself as “a hero of war and peace” and a strong leader who 
was in control and serving Egypt by maintaining stability (Ezzat 2011: 3). The most profound 
illustration of his insolence was in the second of the three speeches delivered during the 
eighteen day uprisings when he announced that he had “lived and fought for [Egypt’s] 
sake...and on this land [he] will die...” (Washington Post 10 February 2011).  Mubarak’s 
speeches  also  consistently  utilised  overly  formal  language  and  contained  bad  pro-
government propaganda which failed to acknowledge the growing discontent of his citizens 
(Esmat 2011). An example of the propaganda incorporated into Mubarak’s speeches was 
his reference to the pride he had for his “long years of service of Egypt and its people” and 
his claim that he had “defended its land and…its interests” (Washington Post 10 February 
2011).  
 
Furthermore, every speech during the uprisings started with the sentence, “Dear Brother 
citizens”, as had been done by Mubarak for decades (Esmat 2011). Nasry Esmat, a journalist 
for Emaj Magazine, wrote on 19 February 2011, that, “…by using formal language and 
relying on speeches written by bad propaganda writers, Mubarak closed the door in the 
face of Egyptians who wanted to understand his point of views…in his last three speeches 
after 25th of January, Mubarak used that quote to start, while millions of Egyptians were 
saying at the same time: “Can’t you change your ways?””.  
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The Coalescence of a Unified & Broad Opposition: Egyptians of all Political Stripes 
During  the  Egyptian  uprisings,  the  coalescence  of  a  broad  opposition  was  evident. 
Patriotism was seen to take precedence over any other political or religious preference held 
by the various groups of protestors and the homogenous character of Egyptian society 
allowed protestors to set aside any political differences (Stacher 2012: 18; Beydoun 2011). 
In Tahrir Square, women in veils stood alongside unveiled women, men protested alongside 
women, and Muslims shared with Coptic Christians the chants of calling on Mubarak to step 
down (Atassi 2011: 33). The coalescence of the Egyptian people during the uprisings is also 
well illustrated by what is referred to as the Friday of Anger. Following Friday prayers on  
28 January 2011, “...Egyptians of all political stripes poured out of mosques, unified by their 
demand  for  the  ruling  regime’s  downfall”  (Darwish  2011:  14).  Indeed,  the  Egyptian 
uprisings were not led by Islamist movements such as Al Qaeda, whose top leader, Al 
Zawahiri, had long advocated the use of violence in instigating political change to Egyptian 
youths (Benantar 2011). No Islamic political slogans were present during the protests, nor 
were  any  pro-Palestinian  or  anti-Israeli  banners  seen  (Darwish  2011).  Indeed,  Shehata 
(2011: 30) argues that, despite throwing its full weight behind the protests, the Muslim 
Brotherhood  “purposefully  kept a  low  profile”  and  did  not  utilise  any  religious  slogans 
which may have overshadowed the secularism.  
 
Ultimately, throughout the protests that resulted in the collapse of Mubarak’s regime, the 
demands  of  protestors  were  not  based  on  religious  or  political  preferences;  their  only 
unified demand was to see the fall of the Mubarak regime (Darwish 2011). Mubarak’s 
persuasive powers were therefore limited as he could not appeal to any one segment of the 
population  nor  could  he  offer  inducements  that  would  satisfy  all  (Darwish  2011).  It  is 
important to note that, while there was an evident coalescence of a unified and broad 
opposition who shared the goal of removing Mubarak from power, the opposition group 
did not have a harmonised vision of what shape and form a post-Mubarak Egypt would take 
(Goldstone  2011:  14).  Indeed,  the  lack  of  religious  rhetoric  employed  by  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood during the uprisings has been argued by some scholars to have been a tactical 
and  transitory  ploy  (Byman  2011:  52).  By  keeping  any  extreme  views  on  religion, 
nationalism, gender roles or human rights quiet, the opposition group was able to remain 
unified  and  achieve  its  goal  of  removing  Mubarak  from  power  which  increased  the 
likelihood of any group within the opposition achieving the post-Mubarak Egypt that they 
specifically desired (Doran 2011: 19).  In short, after achieving the collapse of the Mubarak 
regime, the various groups that formed the opposition split and the once unified goal of the 37 
 
opposition instead became a “marketplace of ideas” in which each group vied for political 
support of their cause (Snyder & Ballantyne 1996: 13; Byman 2011). 
 
Despite the possible veiled motives of various groups within the opposition, the opposition 
was able to demonstrate peacefully and remained non-violent. Throughout the revolution, 
Egyptian protestors printed and distributed pamphlets that contained the writings of Gene 
Sharp which urged protestors to remain peaceful (Kinsman 2011).  Hospitals were also set 
up by protestors and neighbourhood watches were started that did not allow any looting or 
violence  (Beydoun  2011:  23).  Beydoun  (2011:  23)  argues  that  all  of  these  actions  by 
protestors  further  strengthened  their  sense  of  unity  and  resulted  in  a  more  resilient 
determination to remove Mubarak from power. Even when Mubarak’s thugs attempted to 
instigate  violence,  in  the  hopes  of  aborting  the  revolution,  it  had  a  minimal  effect  as 
protestors stood their ground, remained peaceful and reiterated their demands (Al-Ahram 
Weekly Online 18 May 2011). The fact that protestors did not resort to the use of violence, 
ultimately also led to a decline in the scope of the regime’s coercive apparatus (Beydoun 
2011). The decision of protestors to remain non-violent made the decision of the military to 
defect somewhat straightforward (Stacher 2012). The military understood that the use of 
coercive power could not be justified whilst protestors remained non-violent and that, if 
force was used, the military could itself become delegitimized (Stacher 2012). Furthermore, 
by having a unified and broad opposition, every military officer was able to identify with the 
opposition which ultimately meant that the cohesion of the state’s coercive apparatus was 
undermined (Stacher 2012). Essentially, the military lacked any will to use force against an 
opposition group with which it identified.  
 
Strategic Use of Social Media: Egypt in the Twittersphere 
As explained in the theoretical section in the first part of this thesis, the use of social media 
by  protesters  has  a  four-fold  effect:  it  increases  the  likelihood  of  a  broad  opposition 
coalescing, increases the likelihood of emulation effects, allows protestors to effectively 
organise demonstrations and evade police, and can help to garner the support of Western 
powers and their populations which, in turn, can bring about changes in Western states’ 
foreign policy. In terms of social media cultivating a broad opposition to the regime, the 
ability of the Egyptian population to communicate freely and discuss political issues with 
not only each other but with the outside world had a massive impact on the success of the 
uprisings (Kubba 2000: 88). Not only did the use of social network sites, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, allow the formation of political groups which had been severely restricted by 38 
 
the Mubarak regime for decades, but also allowed for protestors to discuss whether others 
were willing “to take to the streets” (Scott 2012). One young Egyptian man commented 
that the revolution was “like Wikipedia…everyone [was] contributing content…we drew this 
whole picture of a revolution [and] no one [was] a hero in that picture” (Khoury 2011: 80). 
 
In terms of protestors being able to effectively organise demonstrations, protestors were 
able  to  post  “minute  by  minute  instructions  about  where  to  gather...[and  how]  to 
outmanoeuvre police” (Khoury 2011: 80). Social media also ensured that the opposition 
remained united as the opposition’s motivations and goals were discussed and agreed to 
online (Kubba 2000).  By doing this, fissures within the group were remedied online and did 
not emerge on the streets (Khoury 2011: 80).  The Mubarak regime’s response to the use of 
social media, that of shutting down the internet and other forms of communication, further 
damaged his legitimacy and increased the discontent of the population (Scott 2012). Dunn 
(2011) argues that, as a result of Mubarak’s actions, the businesses of apolitical citizens 
were disrupted as international bank transactions were hindered. These apolitical citizens 
became  disillusioned  with  the  regime  and,  as  a  result,  the  opposition  was  bolstered. 
Despite  the  limitations  imposed  by  Mubarak  on  the  internet,  Egyptians  soon  used 
circumvention software to continue Tweeting and posting to Facebook (Dunn 2011). When 
Mubarak shut down the internet completely, Egyptians called friends in other countries to 
Tweet  for  them  (Dunn  2011).  The  ability  of  protestors  to  continue  using  social  media 
resulted in the regime effectively losing control over the flow of information thereby losing 
its ability to exercise its persuasive power (Morsi 2011). 
 
For  Scott  (2012),  the  Egyptian  protestors’  use  of  YouTube,  Twitter  and  Facebook  also 
helped  the  uprisings  gain  international  legitimacy  thereby  undermining  the  already 
damaged international legitimacy of the Mubarak regime. Essentially, the virtual voice of 
Egyptians was disseminated to the world through international media outlets and, rather 
than  appearing  to  be  “foreign  and  violent”,  protestors  were  understood  and  passively 
supported in their plight for human rights and political participation (Scott 2012). Due to 
the evident gains of the protestors in international empathy, the regime was limited in the 
persuasive  power  it  could  exert  internationally  as  any  pro-Mubarak  propaganda  was 
unlikely to be effective  (Stein 2012: 49).  
 39 
 
Social  media  also  assisted  in  spreading  the  emulation  effects  of  the  Tunisian  Jasmine 
Revolution. The self-immolation of a Tunisian man, Mohamed Bouazizi, on 17 December 
2010 and the subsequent collapse of the Tunisian regime leader, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, 
who had been in power for 23 years was said to spread a zeitgeist around the Arab world 
(Al-Zubaidi  &  Paul  2011).  The  use  of  Twitter  allowed  Egyptians  to  follow  the  Tunisian 
uprisings and the subsequent overthrow of Ben Ali and had a two-fold effect: protestors 
became aware of the overt illegitimacy of authoritarian rule and learnt how to bring about 
regime collapse.   
 
The Tunisian revolution also awakened the Egyptian people to the notion that ousting an 
autocrat was in fact possible (Paciello 2011: 10). Indeed, the toppling of Ben Ali signalled to 
others under regimes of repression that they too could be revolutionaries (Kinsman 2011; 
Lancaster 2011). The Egyptian Independent Newspaper reported, on 15 January 2011, that 
the  toppling  of  Ben  Ali  took  over  the  “Egyptian  Twittersphere”  with  many  individuals 
relating  the  events  to  their  own  nation  (Osman  2011).  Notable  comments  on  Twitter 
included, “From [Nicolae] Ceauşescu to Ben Ali, people need to learn that dictatorships can 
resist but can also immediately fall” and “Oh Ben Ali, tell Mubarak a plane is also waiting for 
him” (Osman 2011). Not only did the use of Facebook by Tunisians during the uprisings 
create a “shared awareness” of how to remove a dictator, but the Tunisians could actually 
be said to have mentored the Egyptians, especially in techniques of non-violence (Kinsman 
2011: 39). Essentially, the Jasmine Revolution provided the Egyptians with a “masterclass in 
non-violent revolution” and indicated to the Egyptian people that, by remaining peaceful, 
the military was also likely to restrain itself and the regime could plausibly lose a core 
component of its coercive apparatus (De La Rubia 2011).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Overview of Research & Findings 
The  abrupt  collapse  of  the  Mubarak  regime,  which  was  perceived  by  many  to  be  as 
“immovable as the pyramids”, had many scholars stymied (Hamid 2011: 102). This thesis 
sought to answer the question of why the Mubarak regime collapsed so suddenly after 
being faced with a popular uprising for a mere eighteen days. The core hypothesis put 
forward by this thesis was that the coalescing of four key developments resulted in the 
Mubarak regime’s power, both persuasive and coercive, being exposed as truly hollow. 
Through  a  thorough  analysis  of  regime  transition  theories,  the  author  developed  a 40 
 
theoretical framework which included four key developments. These four developments 
included  declining  regime  legitimacy,  defection  of  external  allies  and  the  military,  the 
coalescence of a broad and unified opposition and the strategic use of social media by the 
opposition.  
 
When the theoretical framework was applied to the collapse of the Mubarak regime in 
Egypt, all four  causal explanations were found to be manifestly present and the hypothesis 
put forward in this thesis therefore appeared to be confirmed. The declining legitimacy of 
the  Mubarak  regime  had  been  evident  for  some  time  and  was  primarily  caused  by 
Mubarak’s  extended  use  of  the  legitimation  strategies  of  election  manipulation,  the 
creation of an external other and Mubarak’s plans for hereditary leadership succession. The 
dire performance of the Mubarak regime in terms of its human rights abuses, economic 
mismanagement and corruption also contributed toward the declining legitimacy of the 
regime. As a result, the regime and its ruler were considered by the population to be 
irredeemable and, as such, any attempted use of persuasive power, including the use of 
propaganda,  was  not  only  ineffective  but  further  added  to  the  de-legitimation  of  the 
regime. 
 
The foreign policies of external allies, most notably the US, had been fairly constant during 
Mubarak’s reign. However, in 2002, the US linked its provision of aid to Egypt to democratic 
political reforms following the detention of a US citizen for defaming Egypt and, in 2005, 
subtle pressure was placed on Mubarak to hold democratic elections. US-Egyptian relations 
also remained constant during Obama’s inauguration, however, his 2009 speech, in which 
the  US  promised  to  support  those  who  rose  up  against  non-democratic  forms  of 
government, provided some subtle criticism of the Mubarak regime. It was therefore only 
once the uprisings occurred that the US explicitly stated that it would no longer support the 
Mubarak  regime  and  a  shift  in  foreign  policy  occurred.  The  external  legitimacy  of  the 
Mubarak regime was also significantly damaged through its involvement in practices of 
extraordinary rendition and the torture of terrorist suspects. With no moral credibility, 
when uprisings did occur the regime found itself with only a handful of international allies, 
most  from  the  Arab  world,  willing  to  offer  only  verbal  support.  None  were  willing  to 
intervene, militarily or otherwise, on Mubarak’s behalf. In this way, the Mubarak regime 
was unable to expand its coercive apparatus with which it might have quelled the uprisings. 
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The defection of the Egyptian military from the regime occurred on 28 January 2011. With 
the military’s declaration that it was not willing to turn its weapons on the population, the 
coercive apparatus  of the  Mubarak  regime,  in  terms of  both  scope  and  cohesion,  was 
almost eradicated. The defection of the police, in addition to the already defected military, 
caused a shift in the balance of power between the ruler and the ruled and Mubarak was 
ultimately forced to rely on his persuasive powers alone. However, Mubarak lacked the 
political and oratory skills to do this and, through the use of bad pro-regime propaganda, 
lost further legitimacy in the eyes of his people.  
 
Mubarak’s lack of persuasive powers was further compounded by the coalescence of a 
broad and unified opposition. Protestors included members of every segment of Egyptian 
society  and  Mubarak  was  essentially  unable  to  offer  any  inducements  or  reforms  that 
would satisfy them all. The use of non-violent protests by a unified and broad opposition 
was also considered to have been a deciding factor in bringing about the defection of the 
military. Any use of violence on the part of the military against non-violent protestors could 
plausibly de-legitimise it. Furthermore, given the broad representation of Egyptian society 
by  the  opposition,  the  military  was  able  to  relate  to  at  least  some  of  the  opposition 
members and therefore lacked the ultima ratio regum to use its weapons to protect the 
regime.  In  this  way,  the  scope  and  cohesion  of  Mubarak’s  coercive  apparatus  was 
undermined. 
 
The final factor which was shown in this thesis to have contributed to the collapse of the 
Mubarak regime was the strategic use of social media by the opposition. Protestors were 
able to consolidate their motivations and goals through the use of online forums and blogs. 
The online postings of where to protest and the presence of regime authorities constricted 
the regime’s effective use of its coercive apparatus as protestors were literally able to 
outmanoeuvre  police  and  security  forces.  Mubarak’s  attempts  at  shutting  down  the 
internet only  further  delegitimised  him  in  the eyes  of  his  population  and  also  brought 
previously apolitical Egyptians, especially business owners, onto side with the opposition. 
Overall, the Mubarak regime lost its control over the flow information and therefore lost its 
ability to effectively employ its persuasive power.  
 
The strategic use of social media by protestors also gained the protestors international 
legitimacy  and  further  damaged  the  external  legitimacy  of  the  regime.  International 42 
 
empathy appeared to be squarely for the protestors and appeals by the Mubarak regime to 
the international community were ineffective. Additionally, social media ensured that the 
emulation effects of the Tunisian uprisings had full effect. A shared awareness of the true 
frailty  of  authoritarian  regimes  occurred  and  the  Egyptian  population  was  essentially 
provided with a master class in how to bring about regime collapse. 
 
The  main  finding  of  this  thesis,  that  four  key  developments  or  causal  explanations 
coalesced  to  expose  the  hollowness  of  the  Mubarak  regime’s  power,  has  provided  an 
insight as to why the Mubarak regime collapsed within a short period of the onset of a 
popular uprising. In so doing, this thesis not only contributes toward a general knowledge 
of the Arab Uprisings of 2011 but also confirms that the regime transition theories, which 
were developed during the third wave of democracy in the 1970s, are still exceptionally 
relevant to explaining regime transition in the contemporary era. The research presented in 
this thesis would also allow scholars to gain an insight into why authoritarian regimes are 
still present and sometimes persistent in contemporary society.  
 
Limitations of Research  
While the theoretical framework developed in this thesis provided a succinct explanation 
for many of the factors that contributed toward the collapse of the Mubarak regime, it can 
by no means be argued to have accounted for all of the plausible factors that may have 
been  present.  Indeed,  as  Geddes  (1999:  119)  notes,  no  social  science  theory  can  be 
expected to “explain everything or predict perfectly”.  Almond et al (1973) also identify that 
“all [theoretical] models are abstractions from realities and any one model can apply to 
only  a  limited  set  of  variables”.  As  a  result  of  this,  it  appears  that  some  part  of  the 
explanation of why regimes collapse will not always be accounted for (Almond et al 1973). 
Social  science  theories  therefore  can  only  offer  mere  insights  into  social  phenomenon 
through retrospective analysis and will never fulfil the need to provide an all-encompassing 
overview of why regimes collapse. 
 
A further limitation is that, despite offering key insights into the collapse of the Mubarak 
regime  in  Egypt,  the  findings  of  this  research  are  not  generalisable  for  all Arab  Spring 
revolutions. The four developments that coalesced to produce the collapse of the Mubarak 
regime  are  essentially  Egypt-specific  and  it  cannot  be  argued  that  the  same  causal 
conjunction would also explain regime collapse in states like Tunisia, Libya and possibly 
Syria. The theoretical framework developed can, however, be applied to other cases of 43 
 
regime collapse, in order to ascertain whether any of the factors were in fact present in 
other  case  studies.  Furthermore,  future  research  could  also  consider  why,  when  these 
factors are present, some regimes collapse and others do not.  In essence, “other patterns 
[of regime collapse] await discovery” (Geddes 1999, 142). 
 
An additional limitation of this research has been that, due to the use of a single case study, 
the  author  was  unable  to  develop  a  causal  framework  which  identified  sufficient  and 
necessary variables of regime collapse. Such a framework would be exceptionally helpful in 
considering regime collapses and could be developed through a comparative analysis of 
several case studies. Future research could therefore also focus on whether regime collapse 
can actually be caused by a single sufficient independent variable, or whether there are no 
sufficient independent variables and regime collapse, as a social phenomenon, can only 
occur when necessary independent variables coalesce.  
 
Finally, the post-transition politics in Egypt raises both important and interesting questions 
which require future research. Specifically, research should focus on whether democratic 
principles will truly take hold in Egypt or whether, with the Muslim Brotherhood in power, 
the  prospects  for  liberal  democracy  are  dire.  The  Arab  Spring  Revolutions  of  2011 
demonstrated that those seeking a more legitimate and open form of government has not 
yet dwindled and the collapse of authoritarian regimes still inspires social scientists in their 
fascinations with how and why particular states move toward or away from democracy. 
There is little doubt that what has been achieved by the Egyptian people is nothing short of 
spectacular.  However,  the  Egyptian  story  does  not merely  end with  the  collapse  of  its 
‘pharaoh’.  Indeed,  as  one  journalist  has  noted  “the  Egyptian  revolution  was 
spontaneous...[but] the building of democracy can’t be left to spontaneity too” (Al-Ahram 
Weekly 22 June 2011).  
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